






Oral Tradition, Epistemic Dependence, 
and Knowledge in African Cultures
Abstract
This paper examines the nature and legitimacy of oral tradition as a method of acquir­
ing, archiving, retrieving, and transmitting knowledge, beliefs, values, and practices in tra­
ditional African communal cultures. I argue that oral tradition, which involves parables, 
proverbs, myths, art, and folklore, also involves relying on elders as the repositories of 
knowledge and tradition. I argue that this reliance can be justified based on the principles 
of epistemic trust, epistemic dependence, and epistemic communalism. The notion of epis­
temic communalism, which involves epistemic division of labour and epistemic comparative 
advantage, requires a multidisciplinary holistic approach to knowledge in Africa. This com­
munal method of acquiring knowledge indicates how people accept beliefs and justify their 
acceptance of beliefs as members of an organically integrated community. This underscores 
the need for mutual dependence among philosophy and other disciplines such as history, 














































“Dike	 and	Biobaku’s	books	became	 the	models	 for	 the	new	historiography.	 In	 an	 important	
departure	from	conventional	historical	canons	of	the	day,	they	championed	the	use	of	oral	tradi-
tion,	which	they	used	in	their	book	to	a	limited	extent	together	with	British	documents.”4

























superabundance	 in	African	culture,	are	an	obvious	 item	in	 the	oral	heritage.	They	frequently	










I	might	also	suggest	 that	oral	 tradition	cannot	be	devoid	of	other	 forms	or	
methods	of	documentation	besides	writing	that	has	heuristic	epistemic	value	
and	philosophical	relevance.	For	instance,	Wiredu	indicates	that	distinct	from	
oral	 tradition	 in	African	 cultures	 “are	 art	motifs,	 sometimes	 painted,	 other	
times	carved	out	of	wood	or	cast	in	other	media.	Many	of	these	express	deep	
philosophical	conceptions”.8
Barry	Hallen	 argues	 that	 there	 are	 drawbacks	 in	 oral	 tradition.	 It	 is	 open-
textured	 and	 the	 knowledge	 it	 represents	 “becomes	 collective	 rather	 than	
personal,	rote-learned	rather	than	reasoned”.9	This	comment	presupposes	the	





























African Historiographies: What History for 
Which Africa,	 Sage	 Publications,	 London	
1986,	pp.	197–205.
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In	 the	 debate	 regarding	 the	 nature	 and	 exi-
stence	of	African	philosophy,	those	who	deny	
the	 existence	 of	 African	 philosophy	 argue	
that	what	is	usually	characterized	as	African	
philosophy	 is	 not	 legitimate	 philosophy	 but	
‘ethnophilosophy’.	They	distinguish	between	
‘ethnophilosophy’	 and	 ‘formal	 philosophy’.	
The	former	represents	the	traditional	and	co-
mmonly	 held	 beliefs	 and	 ideas	 of	 people	 in	
African	 cultures	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 folklore,	
myths,	 and	 values.	 The	 latter,	 which	 they	
claim	 is	 the	 only	 legitimate	 philosophy,	 re-
presents	the	written	ideas	of	formally	trained	
philosophers	 who	 teach	 and	 do	 research	 at	
Universities.	See,	among	others:	P.	O.	Bodun-
rin,	 “The	 Question	 of	African	 Philosophy”,	
in:	 Richard	A.	Wright	 (ed.),	 African Philo­
sophy: An Introduction,	 University	 Press	 of	
America,	New	York	 1984,	 pp.	 1–23;	Kwasi	
Wiredu,	Philosophy and an African Culture,	
Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 London	 1980;	
Paulin	 Hountondji,	 African Philosophy,	 In-
diana	 University	 Press,	 Bloomington	 1983;	
Kwame	Anthony	Appiah,	Necessary Questi­
ons: An Introduction to Philosophy,	Prentice	
Hall,	 Englewood	 Cliffs	 (NJ)	 1989;	 Kwame	
Anthony	Appiah,	In My Father’s House: Afri­
ca in the Philosophy of Culture,	Oxford	Uni-
versity	Press,	New	York	1992.
6
Kwasi	 Wiredu,	 “An	 Oral	 Philosophy	 of	
Personhood:	 Comments	 on	 Philosophy	 and	
Orality”,	 Research in African Literature 40	

















Oruka12	 have	 sought	 to	 identify	 a	 different	 aspect	 of	 oral	 tradition,	which	
involves	 their	 efforts	 to	 identify	 individuals	 with	 wisdom	 and	 knowledge	
of	African	traditions.	Hallen	and	Sodipo	identified	such	people	as	onisegun	





























entities,	mystical	 or	 ancestral	 powers,	while	 scientific	 cultures	have	myths	










abstract	 representations,	 practices,	 and	 concrete	 physical	 experiences	 have	
proved	 to	 be	 a	 useful	 and	 an	 effective	method	of	 teaching,	 understanding,	





































struction of Social Reality, Penguin	 Books,	




Cf.	Barry	Hallen,	 J.	O.	 Sodipo,	Knowledge, 
Belief, and Witchcraft: Analytic Experiments 
in African Philosophy,	 Stanford	 University	
Press,	Stanford	(CA)	1997.
12
Odera	 Oruka,	 Sage Philosophy: Indigenous 
Thinker and the Modern Debate on African 
Philosophy,	E.	J.	Brill,	Leiden	1990.
13
Willard	 Van	 Orman	 Quine,	 “Two	 Dogmas	






Cf.	 Parker	 English,	 Nancy	 Steele	 Hamme,	
“Using	Art	History	and	Philosophy	to	Com-
pare	a	Traditional	and	a	Contemporary	Form	
of	African	Moral	Thought”,	Journal of Social 







‘indoctrination’	 is	 actually	 an	 essential	 ele-
ment	or	aspect	of	‘education’.	Hence,	it	is	di-
fficult	to	make	a	clear-cut	distinction	between	
‘education’	and	 ‘indoctrination’	 in	 the	broad	
practice	of	 imparting	knowledge.	See:	Poly-
carp	Ikuenobe,	Philosophical Perspectives on 






















especially	 the	methods	of	 inquiring	about	 and	acquiring	knowledge	 that	 is	
captured	 aptly	 by	 the	 informal	 use	 of	 different	 forms	 of	 oral	 and	 encoded	







riences	 from	which	 children	 can	draw	knowledge,	 learn	 about	 the	 cultural	
history	and	traditions,	and	the	propriety	or	acceptability	of	particular	actions	















rican	people,	which	 represents	 their	 body	of	 knowledge	 (practices,	 values,	






























































Delta	 Proverbs”,	 The Journal of American 













Ijo	 of	 the	Niger	Delta”.	 For	 a	 discussion	 of	


































educate	 them	about	 the	communal	ways	of	 life	and	the	basis	for	deference	
to,	 and	 dependence	 on,	 elders	 as	moral	 and	 epistemic	 authorities	who	 are	
the	sources	of	all	forms	of	traditional	knowledge	and	values.27	It	is	usually	














































and	 the	 requisite	principles	of	human	action.	As	one	grows	 in	age	and	ex-
perience,	one	begins	informally	to	learn	how	to	act	and	acquire	the	relevant	









the	 social	 institutions,	 examples,	 narratives,	 and	 practices	 to	 reinforce	 the	
teachings	and	 traditions	of	 the	 community	because	everyone	had	 some	 re-
sponsibility	 in	 raising	and	caring	for	children.	This	 is	 the	basis	of	 the	now	
popular	African	idea	or	saying	that	‘it	takes	a	village	or	community	to	raise	
a	child’.	Simply	because	everyone	has	the	responsibility	of	raising	or	caring	
for	 children	 in	 the	 community,	 it	 does	not	 follow	 that	 everyone	may	meet	
that	responsibility.	It	should	be	noted	that	not	every	adult	in	the	community	
is	morally	upright	and	not	everyone	can	have	a	direct	impact	on	every	child.	









Kevin	 McDonough,	 “The	 Importance	 of	
Examples	for	Moral	Education:	An	Aristote-




The	 principle	 of	 epistemic	 dependence	 says	
that	A	can	depend	on	the	authority	of	B,	if	B	
has	 evidence	 to	 justify	 a	 belief.	Thus	A	can	
use	the	authority	of	B	and	B’s	evidence	to	ju-
stify	his	own	belief,	 in	 spite	of	 the	 fact	 that	
he	himself	lacks	the	evidence.	See:	John	Har-




















traditions,	and	 it	 is	deemed	important	as	 the	moral	underpinning	and	prag-




and	 justification	 of	 practices,	 principles,	 values,	 and	 prescribed	 actions,	 in	
that	they	have	their	foundation	in	the	community’s	commonly	accepted	value,	
interests,	and	human	well-being.



















tradition,	 and	 in	 the	 process,	 promote	 human	welfare	 and	 harmony	 in	 the	
community	by	people	following	traditions.
The	highest	moral	status	for	the	living	includes	elders,	people	with	traditional	


























cannot	use	the	palm	of	one	hand	to	cover	the wide ‘mouth’ of a pot adequa­
tely”	underscores	the	role	of	the	community	as	an	institution	and	elders	in	the	



















































(ed.),	 African Philosophy,	 pp.	 183–197,	 p.	
189.
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Epistemic Dependence and 
Communal Reliance on Elders
The	 reliance	 on	 elders	 involves	 the	 epistemic	 principle	 that	 individuals	
could	 justify	 their	beliefs	based	on	 the	authority	of,	or	place	 their	 trust	on,	




























Based	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 epistemic	 dependence	 and	 process reliabilism,	
elders	 were	 rightly	 considered	 paternalistic	 custodians	 and	 conveyors	 of	
knowledge.	Thus,	people	were	justified	in	deferring	epistemically	to,	and	rely	





































tricate	 for	us	alone	 to	 independently	understand,	evaluate,	 and	establish	as	















Such	 acceptance	would	 require	 us	 to	 subordinate	 our	 epistemic	 judgment,	
cognitive	autonomy,	rational	 independence	 to	some	authority	–	 in	 terms	of	
depending	on	or	deferring	to	epistemic	authorities.	Hence,	one	cannot	mean-
ingfully	maintain	cognitive	and	rational	independence,	since	a	single	person	






J.	 Hardwig,	 “Epistemic	 Dependence”,	 pp.	
335–349.
34
K.	Wiredu,	Philosophy and an African Cultu­
re,	p.	29;	Kwasi	Wiredu,	Cultural Universal 










labour,	 sharing	of	evidence,	and	 reliance	on	 the	 inter-subjective	agreement	











The	 highest	 court	 of	 appeal	 for	 rationality	 and	 epistemic	 justification	 lies	


















their	will	every time	 to	make	every	decision,	and	it	 is	 irrational	for	anyone	
to	do	so,	especially	 if	such	decisions	are	contrary	 to	 the	accepted	views	of	











perspectives.	This	 suggests	 a	 view	 of	 knowledge	 as	 holistic	 and	 requiring	
multiple	perspectives	and	disciplines	or	expertise.	This	holistic	approach	to	
knowledge	in	African	tradition	and	the	efforts	to	retrieve	and	reconstruct	the	

















































the	nature	of	 the	subject	matter	 in	question.	Hardwig	argues	 that,	 even	 for	




K.	Wiredu,	Cultural Universal and Particu­
lars,	p.	105.
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quiry,	 individuals	 have	 a	 responsibility	 to	 share	 ideas,	 information,	 (es-
pecially	of	a	practical	type)	and	evidence	that	could	make	the	community	
better	or	help	others.











systems,	which	 requires	 that,	 in	some	situations,	 the	overriding	of	an	 indi-
vidual’s	will	be	necessary	to	achieve	some	requisite	communal	epistemic	or	
practical	goals.
This	point	 is	also	underscored	by	Steve	Fuller’s	argument	 that	 the	 idea	of	

















munity,	might	be	 irrelevant	 to	 an	 individual’s	 justification	 (qua	 individual,	
independent	of	the	community)	for	a	belief.43	Thus,	the	dominant	individu-





















Usmena tradicija, spoznajna 
ovisnost i znanje u afričkoj kulturi
Sažetak
Istraživanje ispituje prirodu i legitimnost usmene tradicije kao metode stjecanja, pohranjiva­
nja, povrata i prenošenja znanja, vjerovanja, vrijednosti i praksi u tradicionalnoj afričkoj kul­
turnoj zajednici. Obrazlažem da usmena tradicija, koja uključuje parabole, krilatice, mitove, 
umjetnost i folklor, također uključuje oslanjanje na starješine kao spremišta znanja i tradicije. 
Obrazlažem da se ovo oslanjanje može opravdati principima spoznajna povjerenja, spoznajne 
ovisnosti i spoznajnog komunalizma. Pojam spoznajnog komunalizma, koji uključuje spoznaj­
nu podjelu rada i spoznajnu komparativnu prednost, treba multidisciplinarni holistički pristup 
znanju u Africi. Komunalna metoda stjecanja znanja upućuje na to kako ljudi prihvaćaju vjero­
vanja i opravdavaju svoje prihvaćanje vjerovanja kao članovi organičke integrirane zajednice. 
Osnažuje se potreba za zajedničkom ovisnosti filozofije i drugih disciplina poput povijesti, an­





Mündliche Tradition, Erkenntnissucht 
und Wissen in der afrikanischen Kultur
Zusammenfassung
Die Forschung untersucht die Natur und die Legitimität der mündlichen Tradition als Methode 
des Erwerbs, Speicherns, der Aufspürung und Überlieferung von Wissen, Überzeugungen, Wer­
ten und Praktiken in der traditionellen afrikanischen Kulturgemeinschaft. Ich begründe, dass die 
40




Steve	 Fuller,	 Social Epistemology,	 Indiana	
University	Press,	Bloomington	1988,	p.	3.
42
This	 idea	 is	 articulated	 by	 F.	 Schmitt.	 See:	
Frederick	 Schmitt,	 “The	 Justification	 of	
Group	Beliefs”,	 in:	 Frederick	 Schmitt	 (ed.),	
Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimen­








mündliche Tradition, die Parabeln, Schlagworte, Mythen, Kunst und Folklore umfasst, ebenso 
die Anlehnung an die Oberhäupter als Wissens­ und Traditionsspeicher einschließt. Ich begrün­
de, diese Anlehnung könne durch die Prinzipien des Erkenntnisvertrauens, der Erkenntnissucht 
sowie des erkenntnismäßigen Kommunalismus rechtfertigt werden. Der Begriff des erkenntnis­
mäßigen Kommunalismus, der eine kognitive Arbeitsteilung und einen kognitiven komparativen 
Vorteil einbezieht, erfordert einen multidisziplinären holistischen Ansatz zum Wissen in Afrika. 
Die kommunale Methode des Wissenserwerbs weist darauf hin, dass Menschen Überzeugungen 
akzeptieren und deren Akzeptanz der Überzeugungen als Mitglieder einer organischen inte­
grierten Gemeinschaft rechtfertigen. Man bekräftigt den Bedarf an einer gemeinsamen Abhän­
gigkeit von Philosophie und anderen Disziplinen wie Geschichte, Anthropologie, Literatur und 





La tradition orale, la dépendance envers 
la connaissance et le savoir au sein de la culture africaine
Résumé
Cette étude interroge la nature et la légitimité des traditions orales en tant que méthodes d’ac­
quisition, de conservation, et méthode caractérisée par un retour aux sources ; mais encore en 
tant que méthode de transmission des connaissances, des croyances, des valeurs et des prati­
ques au sein de la communauté culturelle traditionnelle africaine. Je montre que la tradition 
orale, qui inclut des paraboles, des maximes, des mythes, l’art et le folklore, s’appuie également 
sur le savoir des anciens et en constitue un « dépôt » pour les connaissances et la tradition. 
J’explique que ce point d’appui peut se justifier par des principes basés sur la confiance dans le 
savoir, la dépendance envers le savoir et le communalisme. Le concept de communalisme de la 
connaissance, qui inclut une division du travail sur la base des connaissances, et qui constitue 
également un avantage pour comparer les connaissances, requiert une approche holistique du 
savoir en Afrique. La méthode communale d’acquisition du savoir renvoie à la manière dont les 
gens adhèrent aux croyances et qu’ils justifient en tant que membres d’une communauté orga­
niquement intégrée. Le besoin pour une dépendance philosophique commune et pour d’autres 
disciplines telles que l’histoire, l’anthropologie, la littérature et les sciences en tant que sources 
et fondements pour le savoir africain se renforce.
Mots-clés
tradition	orale,	communalisme	africain,	savoir	traditionnel,	dépendance	envers	la	connaissance,	com-
munalisme	de	la	connaissance,	ethno-philosophie,	référence	aux	anciens
